


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TITLE: POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN.

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TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 3232 OF 29 SEPTEMBER, 1971 INFO BAGHDAD,
BEIRUT AND TEHRAN.


BAKHTIAR.

ATTORNEY FOR MICHAEL BAKHTIAR, SON OF GENERAL BAKHTIAR AND A U.S.
CITIZEN, HAS ASKED STATE DEPARTMENT FOR THEIR ASSISTANCE IN
PROVIDING LEGAL VERIFICATION OF BAKHTIARS DEATH IN CONNECTION
WITH A COURT CASE HERE. ATTORNEY SAID HE HAD HEARD THAT A PROMINENT
BRITISH KIDNEY SURGEON HAD ATTENDED BAKHTIAR SHORTLY BEFORE HIS
DEATH.

2. STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE NOW ASKED US WHETHER WE CAN IDENTIFY THE
SURGEON INVOLVED IF HE EXISTS. WE POINTED OUT DELICACY OF THIS
ENQUIRY BUT UNDERTOOK TO PASS ON REQUEST.

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TO ROUTINE WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 2574 OF 1 OCTOBER INFO
BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN.

2

YOUR TELNO 3232: BAKHTIAR

1. WE DO NOT HAVE ANY DETAILS OF THE SURGEON ALLEGED TO HAVE
ATTENDED BAKHTIAR.
2. IN VIEW OF BAKHTIAR'S POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE IRANIAN
AUTHORITIES WE WOULD NOT WISH TO PURSUE ENQUIRIES ON BEHALF OF HIS
SON. WE SUGGEST, THEREFORE, THAT THE AMERICANS TRY TO OBTAIN LEGAL
VERIFICATION OF BAKHTIAR'S DEATH VIA THE BELGIANS (WHO LOOK AFTER
AMERICAN INTERESTS IN BAGHDAD).

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TO ROUTINE WASHINGTON TELNO 17 OF 4/10 REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO FCO, BEIRUT AND TEHRAN.

WASHINGTON TELNO 3232 OF 29 SEPTEMBER.
BAKHTIAR.

WE DO NOT HAVE ANY RECORD OF A VISIT BY A BRITISH DOCTOR
THEN, BUT SUSPECT THAT MAY HAVE INDICATED
A VISIT BY A FRENCH DOCTOR.

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TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 845 OF 15 OCTOBER INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD, CAIRO
AND BAHRAIN RESIDENCY.

attached
BAGHDAD TELS NOS 1077 AND 1079: IRAN/IRAQ.

ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, A SPEECH BY THE GOVERNOR OF BAGHDAD, REFERRING TO IRANIAN RESIDENTS OF IRAQ AS "MEMBERS OF THE ENEMY FIFTH COLUMN" HAS BEEN THE SIGNAL FOR MASS EXPULSION OF IRANIAN CITIZENS. KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL OF 15 OCTOBER ESTIMATED THE NUMBER CROSSING THE BORDER DURING THE PAST WEEK AT "NOT LESS THAN 4,500".

2. IT HAS ALSO BEEN CLAIMED THAT IRANIAN CITIZENS HAVE BEEN TORTURED, AND THAT THE INTIMIDATION HAS AFFECTED IRAQIS WITH CLOSE IRANIAN CONNECTIONS.

3. AN EDITORIAL IN KAYHAN OF 15 OCTOBER CALLS FOR THESE ACTS "TO BE BROUGHT TO AN END ONCE AND FOR ALL".

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 1079 OF 14/10 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
IMMEDIATE TO TEHRAN, BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, DOHA, ABU DHABI, WASHINGTON
BEIRUT AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNO 1077 : ISLANDS.

1. THE THREE GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED NEWSPAPERS TODAY CARRY
(UNDER BANNER HEADLINES IN THE CASE OF THE ARABIC ONES) BRIEF
MISREPRESENTATIONS OF MY TALK WITH JAMALI. REFERRING TO "REPORTS
IN THE FOREIGN PRESS THAT BRITAIN HAD DECIDED TO HAND-OVER
THE ISLANDS TO IRAN", THE ARABIC VERSIONS CLAIM THAT I
"DENIED THESE REPORTS AND PROMISED TO CONVEY TO MY GOVERNMENT
THE ANXIETY OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT". IN THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE DAILY THE EMPHASIS IS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT: IT WRITES
THAT I "STRESSED THAT WHAT THE NEWS AGENCIES REPORTED DOES
NOT REPORT POINT OF VIEW OF BRITAIN AND THAT I WILL ASK MY
GOVERNMENT FOR MORE INFORMATION".

2. WHILE THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER'S EDITORIAL ON THE ISLANDS
TODAY IS DIRECTED AGAINST IRAN ALONE, AND THE PARTY ORGAN,
AL-THAWRA, DOES NOT MENTION THE MATTER EDITORIALY, THE
GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPER, AL-JUMHURIYA, CARRIES A LONG EDITORIAL
ON "BRITAIN AND HOSTILITY TO THE ARABS". THIS AGAIN
SUGGESTS THAT I HAD DENIED PRESS REPORTS THAT BRITAIN
"INTENDED TO SURRENDER THESE ISLANDS TO THE MERCENARY
REGIME OF THE SHAH", BUT GOES ON TO SAY THAT "IN VIEW
OF OUR HISTORY IN THE AREA SINCE THE BALFOUR DECLARATION,
THE ANNALS OF WHICH ARE FULL OF DECEIT AND CHEATING AND
HOSTILITY TO THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE ARABS, DISPLAYING
TRICKERY AND HATRED TO THEIR JUST DEMANDS", REVOLUTIONARY
IRAQ IS BOUND TO HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT BRITISH INTENTIONS.
IRAQ WILL CONSIDER BRITAIN'S ACTION OF "SURRENDERING THE
3 ARAB ISLANDS TO THE MERCENARY REGIME IN IRAN AS NOT ONLY
A DANGEROUS STEP IN ESCALATING THE BATTLE WITH THE ARAB
NATION AND ITS LEGITIMATE RIGHTS, BUT ALSO THE BRITISH

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IMPERIALISTS PLOT AIMED AT THREATENING THE SAFETY OF THE REGION OF IRAQ- A MATTER ON WHICH SILENCE CANNOT BE MAINTAINED''. IF BRITAIN REPEATS IN THE ARAB GULF WHAT IT DID IN PALESTINE IN 1948 IT WILL LOSE EVERYTHING AND GAIN THE ENMITY OF ALL THE ARABS. ''THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT MUST NOW ELUCIDATE ITS ATTITUDE CLEARLY AND CONFIRM THE DENIAL MADE BY ITS AMBASSADOR AT BAGHDAD''.

3. THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT FROM THE ABOVE THAT THE IRAQIS WERE ALREADY DETERMINED TO FORCE THIS ISSUE INTO THE OPEN AND WOULD HAVE MISREPRESENTED MY REPLY TO JAMALI WHATEVER WAY I HAD PLAYED IT, AND EVEN IF I HAD PROFESSED IGNORANCE.

4. THOUGH THEY HAVE DELIBERATELY SUPRESSED IT, I REPEATED THE OPERATIVE SENTENCE (PARAGRAPH 2(C) OF MY TELNO 1077) TWICE. AND WHILE I NATURALLY SAID I WOULD REPORT THE CONVERSATION, I DELIBERATELY DID NOT SAY I WOULD ''ASK MY GOVERNMENT FOR MORE INFORMATION'' SINCE I JUDGED IT UNWISE TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO EXPECT A FORMAL REPLY.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 1077 OF 14/10 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
IMMEDIATE TO BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, CAIRO, TEHRAN, DUBAI, JEDDA
KUWAIT, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEWYORK AND BEIRUT.
MY LETTER 4/1 OF 2 OCTOBER TO PARSONS:

IRAQ AND THE ISLANDS.

1. I WAS SUMMONED AT LUNCHTIME YESTERDAY BY FOREIGN UNDER-
SECRETARY JAMALI. HE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WAS DISTURBED
BY INTERNATIONAL PRESS REPORTS (ONE OF THEM IN FIGARO)
AND ALSO DIPLOMATIC REPORTS THAT BRITAIN "HAD DECIDED TO
HAND-OVER TO IRAN" ISLANDS BELONGING TO RAS AL KHAIMAH.
IF THIS WERE TRUE, HE SAID, IRAQ'S LIFE-LINE AMONGST OTHER
THINGS WOULD BE JEOPARDISED, AND BRITAIN'S RELATIONS WITH
IRAQ (AND ALL OTHER ARABS) WHICH IRAQ FOR HER PART WAS
ANXIOUS TO IMPROVE, WOULD SUFFER SEVERELY. COULD I
THEREFORE TELL HIM THE FACTS? HAD WE CHANGED OUR PREVIOUS
ATTITUDE TO ARAB SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS, DESPITE THE
ASSURANCE WHICH YOU (HE SAID) HAD GIVEN RIAD DURING YOUR
RECENT VISIT TO CAIRO? HAD WE DECIDED TO "HAND-OVER"
THE ISLANDS?

2. JUDGING IT BETTER ON THIS OCCASION NOT TO PROFESS TOTAL
IGNORANCE OR SAY THAT I WOULD REPORT HIS ENQUIRY TO YOU
(THEREBY ENCOURAGING THEM TO PESTER US FOR A FORMAL ANSWER),
I SPOKE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) IN VIEW OF THE INTEREST HIS GOVERNMENT WAS NOW SHOWING,
IT WAS A PITY THEY HAD DECLINED TO RECEIVE YOUR PERSONAL
EMISSARY TO DISCUSS GULF PROBLEMS IN MAY.

(B) I HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT MY GOVERNMENT'S
ASSESSMENT OF THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE ON OWNERSHIP OF THE
ISLANDS HAD CHANGED, ANY MORE THAN HAD THAT OF THE IRANIAN
GOVERNMENT. BUT LIKE MANY OTHER PROBLEMS IN THIS IMPERFECT
WORLD THIS ONE COULD EVIDENTLY NOT BE SOLVED SIMPLY BY REFERENCE

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TO LEGALITIES OR BY RESORT TO JUDICIAL PROCESS. NOR (SINCE HE HAD DEFINED IRAQ'S ATTITUDE AS "THE ISLANDS BELONG TO RAS AL KHAIMAH AND ABU MUSA FULL STOP.") COULD IT BE SOLVED BY PUNCTUATION.

(C) WHAT WE HAD THEREFORE BEEN TRYING FOR MANY MONTHS TO DO WAS TO ACT AS HONEST BROKERS IN PURSUIT OF A SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES. WE WERE STILL TRYING.

(D) IN ANY CASE REPORTS ALLEGING THAT WE HAD "DECIDED TO HAND-OVER THE ISLANDS" SURELY MISCONCEIVED THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM BY IMPLYING THAT THE ISLANDS WERE IN OUR GIFT.

3. I ADDED THAT I WAS GLAD TO HEAR HIS GOVERNMENT WAS

"ANXIOUS TO IMPROVE" RELATIONS WITH MINE, FOR THIS HAD SCARCELY BEEN THE IMPRESSION GIVEN BY HIS GOVERNMENT'S BEHAVIOUR SINCE EARLY JULY

JAMALI ALLOWED HIMSELF TO BE RIDDEN-DOWN THAT SIDE-TRACK FOR A TIME BUT REVERTED EVENTUALLY TO HIS ORIGINAL ENQUIRY.

I REPEATED PARAGRAPH 2(C).

4. HE SEEMED CONTENT TO LEAVE IT AT THAT FOR THE PRESENT. BUT WE CANNOT EXPECT LATER SALVOS TO BE AS RESTRAINED AS THIS WARNING SHOT.

5. JAMALI'S REFERENCE TO YOUR CONVERSATION WITH RIAD SUGGESTS, ON THIS SUBJECT AT LEAST, THE IRAQIS HAVE BEEN GIVEN SOMETHING OF A BRIEFING.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 3469 OF 23/10 INFO IMMEDIATE TO BAHRAIN
JEDDA KUWAIT AND CAIRO. (4)

TEHRAN TEL NO 845 TO FCO: IRAN/IRAQ.

MIKLOS , COUNTRY DIRECTOR FOR IRAN IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT,
HAS NOW ALSO ASKED US ABOUT THE REPORT THAT THE UK IS SELLING
HUNTER AIRCRAFT TO IRAQ. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL, THEREFORE, TO
KNOW WHAT THE LATEST POSITION IS ON THIS AND WHAT WE MAY SAY ABOUT
IT TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 856 20 OCTOBER INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD,
PRIORITY BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, WASHINGTON, JEDDA, KUWAIT AND CAIRO.

4
MY TELEGRAM 845 (NOT TO ALL): IRAN/IRAQ

1. MY US COLLEAGUE HAS LET ME KNOW THAT IN THE LAST TWO DAYS BOTH THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND MINISTER OF COURT HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE WORSENING SITUATION WITH IRAQ, INSTANCING THE EXPULSIONS OF IRANIANS AND ALSO TAKRITI'S RECENT STATEMENT TO KUWAITI NEWSPAPER, AS-SIASA, THAT THE REAL THREAT TO PEACE CAME FROM IRAN. FURTHERMORE BOTH KHALATBARI AND ALAM (THE LATTER DIRECTLY FROM THE SHAH) HAD MENTIONED A REPORT THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WAS SELLING HUNTER AIRCRAFT TO IRAQ, AND HAS ASKED WHAT THE BRITISH WERE UP TO. MACARTHUR HAD DISCLAIMED ALL KNOWLEDGE BUT SAID THAT, IF TRUE, THIS WAS DOUBTLESS A SIMPLE COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION.

2. KHALATBARI HAS SUMMONED ME AT 1400 HOURS GMT TOMORROW, 21 OCTOBER, PROBABLY ABOUT IRAQ AND THE HUNTERS. THE US EMBASSY RECALL SEEING A RECENT REFERENCE IN THE PRESS (WHICH I AM TRYING TO TRACE) ABOUT A POSSIBLE SALE. HAS THERE BEEN ANY SALE OR ANY SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IRAQIS SINCE MY TELEGRAM 438 (OF 23 JUNE) WHEN I COMMENTED GENERALLY ON ARMS SALES TO IRAQ? IF NOT, I WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE KHALATBARI THAT NO HUNTER DEAL HAS BEEN CONCLUDED OR IS UNDER DISCUSSION OR CONSIDERATION.

3. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF INSTRUCTIONS COULD REACH ME BY 1200 GMT ON 21 OCTOBER.

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TO FLASH TEHRAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 605 DATED 21 OCTOBER INFO
PRIORITY WASHINGTON. (6)

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 856: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. AS YOU ARE AWARE, IT IS NOT OUR POLICY TO DISCUSS OUR ARMS SALES WITH THIRD PARTIES. IF ASKED, HOWEVER, YOU MAY CONFIRM TO KHALATBARI THAT WE ARE NOT (NOT) ENGAGED IN DISCUSSIONS WITH IRAQ FOR THE SALE OF HUNTERS.

2. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION WE HAVE HAD SOME DISCUSSIONS WITH IRAQ ABOUT THE POSSIBLE SALE OF VARIOUS OTHER ITEMS OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT. THE IRAQIS HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN SOME, BUT TO DATE WE HAVE RECEIVED ORDER FOR 3 ISLANDERS ONLY.

3. YOU SHOULD NOT VOLUNTEER THE INFORMATION IN PARA 2 ABOVE. IF PRESSED ABOUT OTHER POSSIBLE SUPPLIES OF BRITISH ARMS TO IRAQ, HOWEVER, YOU MAY SAY THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN CERTAIN EQUIPMENT BUT THAT NO FIRM ORDERS OF ANY SIGNIFICANCE HAVE BEEN RECEIVED: IN ANY EVENT WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT ANYTHING WE MIGHT SELL TO IRAQ WOULD MAKE A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE TO HER OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY NOR POSE A THREAT TO IRAN.

YOU MIGHT ALSO MAKE THE POINT THAT IN DISCUSSING THESE MATTERS WITH THE IRANIANS WE HAVE ACTED CONTRARY TO OUR USUAL POLICY.

4. (WASHINGTON ONLY) YOU MAY SPEAK TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON THE LINES OF PARAGRAPH 1 ONLY.

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 863 OF 21 OCT INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD
MY TELNO 856, PARA 2.

IRAN/IRAQ.

WHEN I CALLED ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER THIS AFTERNOON HE SAID HE HAD WANTED TO SEE ME IN CONNECTION WITH A REPORT FROM THE IRANIAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN BAGHDAD. KHALATBARI THEN READ AN EXTRACT FROM MEHRAN'S TELEGRAM ABOUT THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR'S REMARKS TO HIM WHEN PAYING A RECENT FAREWELL CALL. ACCORDING TO THIS, THE AMBASSADOR HAD EXPLAINED WHY THE IRAQIS WERE SO CONCERNED ABOUT THE ISLANDS IN THE PERSIAN GULF SEMI COLON IT WAS BECAUSE OF THEIR FEAR THAT IRAN COULD THEN THREATEN IRAQ THROUGH BEING ABLE, AT ANY TIME, TO CLOSE THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. KHALATBARI SAID THAT THE BRITISH MUST SURELY KNOW THAT IRAN WOULD NOT NEED TO USE THE ISLANDS IF THEY WISHED TO INTERFERE WITH THE MOVEMENTS OF IRAQI SHIPPING IN THE PERSIAN GULF. THEY COULD DO THIS MORE EASILY FROM THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS AT BANDAR ABBAS AND THEIR OWN LARGE ISLANDS ON THE IRANIAN SIDE OF THE GULF. HE WAS THEREFORE SURPRISED AT THE AMBASSADOR'S REMARKS, WHICH HE CONSIDERED UNHELPFUL.

2. I EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT THIS SHOULD HAVE CAUSED ANY CONCERN. ASSUMING THAT THE AMBASSADOR HAD SPOKEN AS HE WAS ALLEGED TO HAVE DONE, HE WAS DOING NO MORE THAN EXPLAINING WHAT HE UNDERSTOOD TO BE THE IRAQI VIEW; AND NOT THAT HE HIMSELF UPHELD THAT VIEW. IT SOUNDED TO ME LIKE A PERFECTLY NORMAL COMMENT, PROBABLY IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION. I FELT SURE THAT THE AMBASSADOR, LIKE MYSELF, WOULD SEE NO REASON TO DISAGREE WITH THE IRANIAN VIEW OF THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF THE THREE ISLANDS.

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3. KHALATBARI SAID HE THOUGHT THE SENSE OF THE REPORT INDICATED THAT THE AMBASSADOR WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE IRAQI VIEW. I ASKED HIM TO SUBSTANTIATE THIS BUT, AFTER READING THROUGH THE TELEGRAM (FOUR PAGES), HE FAILED TO DO SO AND, MOREOVER, DID NOT DEMUR WHEN I SAID THAT MEHRAN MIGHT HAVE GOT THE WHOLE THING WRONG. KHALATBARI, WHO WAS FRIENDLY AND POLITE THROUGHOUT, SAID HE WOULD NEVERTHELESS BE GRATEFUL IF I COULD PASS ON HIS REMARKS TO THE AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD.

4. THIS IS AN INSIGNIFICANT EPISODE TO WHICH WE NEED NOT ATTACH IMPORTANCE, THOUGH IT SHOWS HOW EXTREMELY SENSITIVE THE IRANIANS ARE AT THIS MOMENT WHEN THEY BELIEVE THE IRAQIS ARE PREPARING SOME NEW HOSTILE MOVE AGAINST THEM.

5. SEE MY I.F.T.

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 864 OF 21 OCT INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
AND BAGHDAD.

MY I.P.T. (NOT TO WASHINGTON) AND YOUR TELNO 605.

IRAN/IRAQ.

KHALATBARI ALSO ASKED ME ABOUT THE PRESS REPORT (APPARENTLY
FROM ONE OF THE AGENCIES, THOUGH I HAVE NOT MYSELF SEEN IT)
THAT BRITAIN WAS SELLING 50 HUNTERS TO IRAQ. IF TRUE THIS
WOULD BE OF GREAT CONCERN TO IRAN IN VIEW OF IRAQ'S MOUNTING
HOSTILITY TOWARDS HER.

2. I SAID WE HAD ALSO HEARD THIS STORY. IT WAS NOT TRUE.
ALTHOUGH IT WAS CONTRARY TO OUR USUAL PRACTICE, IN VIEW OF
IRAN'S KNOWN CONCERN I COULD CONFIRM, ON AUTHORITY, THAT WE
WERE NOT ENGAGED IN DISCUSSIONS WITH IRAQ FOR THE SALE OF
HUNTERS. KHALATBARI ASKED ABOUT ARMS SALES IN GENERAL AND
I MADE THE POINTS IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE.
HE SEEMED GLAD TO HEAR THIS AND THANKED ME FOR THE INFORMATION.

3. KHALATBARI WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE DETERIORATION IN IRAN'S
RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. THE LARGE-SCALE EXPULSION OF IRANIANS
WAS NO DOUBT CONNECTED WITH THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF
BARZANI. IRAN WAS BEING PREPARED AS A SCAPEGOAT AND, TO A
CERTAIN EXTENT, THE BRITISH TOO. I SAID IT WAS HARD TO JUDGE
WHAT WAS GOING ON IN BAGHDAD OR WHAT WOULD BE THE OUTCOME OF
THE POWER STRUGGLE THERE. OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAD A DIFFICULT
ENOUGH PROBLEM TO SOLVE TOGETHER IN THE PERSIAN GULF. IT WAS,
I BELIEVED, IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST NOT TO ALLOW IRAQ'S SPOILING

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TACTICS TO MAKE THINGS MORE DIFFICULT FOR US. KHALATBARI
AGREED AND SAID HE HOPED WE COULD KEEP IN TOUCH TO AVOID ANY
MISUNDERSTANDINGS IN THIS FIELD.

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 1096 OF 23/10 AND TO TEHRAN.
TEHRAN TELEGRAM NO 863 TO YOU: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. MEHRAN ADVANCED HIS FAREWELL CALL TO 16 OCTOBER IN ORDER TO QUESTION ME ABOUT MY CONVERSATION WITH THE UNDER-SECRETARY (MYTELS 1077 AND 1079). I TOLD HIM WITH CERTAIN MODIFICATIONS WHAT JAMALI HAD SAID TO ME (INCLUDING HIS BIT ABOUT IRAQ'S LIFELINE) AND WHAT I HAD SAID TO HIM. I ALSO BEGAN AND ENDED BY EMPHASISING HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS THAT HIS COUNTRY AND MINE SHOULD ENJOY THE FULLEST POSSIBLE UNDERSTANDING. (IT DOES NOT SOUND AS IF HIS FOUR-PAGE TELEGRAM HAD REFLECTED THIS ASPECT OF OUR CONVERSATION EITHER.)

2. MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF THE ISLANDS CORRESPONDS EXACTLY WITH WHAT KHALATBARI SAID. BUT I WAS INDEED (AND EXPLICITLY) EXPLAINING THE IRAQI POINT OF VIEW; AND IF IT IS NEWS TO THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT THAT THE IRAQIS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, MEHRAN HAS NOT BEEN DOING HIS JOB.

3. THIS WOULD NOT SURPRISE ME. AS WE HAVE LEARNT ONLY TOO WELL IN THE PAST, HIS REPORTS ARE MORE CONCERNED TO IMPRESS HIS MASTERS THAN TO CONVEY THE TRUTH. WHAT SURPRISES ME, IN VIEW OF HIS EFFUSIVE CULTIVATION OF MY EMBASSY, IS THAT HE SHOULD SO OFTEN SEEK TO SOW DISSENSION BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS. THERE IS NO QUESTION OF HIS HAVING "GOT THE WHOLE THING WRONG"; HE IS BOTH QUICK-WITTED AND FLUENT IN ENGLISH. I TRUST FOR ALL OUR SAKES THAT THE SHAH'S OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE NOT AS ERRATIC AND DECEITFUL AS MEHRAN.

BALFOUR PAUL

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*Mehran is a poor
manager. It is good news
that he is leaving
Dad!*
Paul
25/8

KAYHAN

Reference

9 Oct 1971

On Equity 8C

(10)

The "monotomim edifice" is crumbling rapidly!
 I do not think the hanians can be referring
 to anyone but us when they talk of
 "imperialists" and "colonialists".

A lonely position

THE Iraqi junta's eminence grise, Saddam Hussain Takriti, has said that his Ba'athist government "will dispute every inch of territory" in the Persian Gulf with Iran. At the same time he has once again played the ancient harp about "the Arabism of the Gulf."

One could easily dismiss Takriti's hot air as a non sequitor. After all the Ba'athist regime is now so isolated, so divided against itself and in such poor shape politically and economically as to count for very little beyond the ancient city of Baghdad.

Takriti, however, is embarking upon a deliberate attempt to paint Iran as "the real threat" in the region. By doing so he can only serve his imperialist masters who are trying hard to hide behind the mask of "friendship and peace."

For Iraq to speak of the "Arabism" of the Persian Gulf is impertinent to say the least. This is a country which has no more than 40 kilometres of coastline on the waterway. Iran, as everyone knows, has the entire northern coast of the Persian Gulf — some 900 kilometres.

The Persian Gulf belongs to all its littoral states. Anyone who tries to ignore this fact is clearly playing in the hands of the imperialists who wish to continue their policy of divide and rule.

As for Iran's dispute with Iraq over the Shatt al-Arab, it is hardly necessary to recall all the facts. It is, however, necessary to point out once again that the Shatt is a border estuary that must be administered in accordance with the principle of talweg and other principles of international law applying to rivers forming frontiers of two or more countries.

It is sad to see that neighbouring Iraq, under the Ba'athists strongmen, is being used as a pawn in a dangerous game played by the imperialists against the Persian Gulf countries. By whipping up animosity against Iran — as a certain declaration issued in Baghdad last week also showed — and by continuing to keep alive territorial claims against Kuwait while trying to foment trouble in the emirates, the Baghdad regime is only serving the cause of dying colonialism.

Fortunately, however, the majority of the littoral states have proved wise and imaginative enough not to allow Iraq and its colonial masters much room for intrigues and manoeuvre. The era of colonialism is drawing to an end in the Persian Gulf and no one shall be allowed to assume the discarded mantle — least of all the shaky Ba'athist regime of Baghdad.

NE 2 7/324/2

pu 257x

8/5
22/8

Time!

12

CYPHER/CAT A

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 27 OCT 1971 NEQ 3/324/1
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FM WASHINGTON 261642Z

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TO ROUTINE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 3548 OF
26 OCTOBER INFO TEHRAN.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 605 TO TEHRAN: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. ACTION TAKEN ON PARAGRAPH 4 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE WITH MIKLOS, COUNTRY DIRECTOR FOR IRAN. HE SAID HE WAS RELIEVED TO HEAR THAT THERE WERE NO DISCUSSIONS GOING ON BETWEEN THE UK AND IRAQ FOR THE SALE OF HUNTERS AT THIS DELICATE MOMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE PERSIAN GULF ISLANDS. HE REMINDED US, HOWEVER, THAT IN APRIL 1970 WE HAD TOLD THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THE FCO HAD GIVEN THE GO-AHEAD TO HAWKERS TO NEGOTIATE FOR THE SUPPLY OF AN ADDITIONAL 16 RECONDITIONED HUNTERS TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 912 OF 22 APRIL 1970). HE WONDERED WHETHER THE PRESENT REPORTS MIGHT STEM FROM POSSIBLE DELIVERIES TO IRAQ OF HUNTERS UNDER ANY AGREEMENT THAT HAWKERS MIGHT HAVE NEGOTIATED AS A RESULT OF THE GREEN LIGHT GIVEN TO THEM AT THAT TIME. WE SAID THAT TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE HAWKERS HAD NOT IN THE EVENT CONCLUDED ANY CONTRACT WITH THE IRAQIS AND THAT IT SEEMED QUITE CLEAR FROM THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US THAT NO HUNTERS WERE IN THE PROCESS OF BEING DELIVERED TO THE IRAQIS AT THE PRESENT TIME. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL, HOWEVER, FOR CONFIRMATION THAT OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT HAWKERS' NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE IRAQIS DID NOT RESULT IN THE CONCLUSION OF A CONTRACT IS IN FACT CORRECT.

CROMER

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Mr Langer has seen

Mr Gans

Hunters for Iraq.

1. Last years papers are on NEQ 10/4, attached.
The most recent paper is Baghdad tel STOW 36
of 21.9.70. (folio 50). I have elicited the
end of the story from MTS and incorporated
it into the draft tel to Washington.

Veronica Becht
27/10

Good. Tel to issue.

R.E. 27/10.

REPETITION OF TELEGRAMS

REGISTRY
No.

(1) TELEGRAM EXAMINER
COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT

(Date)

(Despatched)

XY33

Please repeat to the posts shown below telegram No.

from/to WASHINGTON

dated

No. 1160

Date

27/10

BAGHDAD

Flash

Immediate

Priority

Routine

En Clair

Code

Cypher

(Signed)

(Dept.)

(Date)

R. L. Osborne

Near Eastern

27/10/11

(2) DEPARTMENT CONCERNED (for Archives)

(For use in Communications Department)

Security classification

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2716552

Addressed to

BAGHDAD

telegram No.

1160

of

and to

Following telegram now repeated to you at request of

DEPT

received from

W' TON

was

telegram No.

3548

of

27/10

1655
27/10/11

[Here insert from A to B of attached telegram]

17102



CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED KINGDOM MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
845 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022


26 October 1971

1. Enter
2. Miss Barrett
3. M. Smith

(13)

3/19/2

S L Egerton Esq
Arabian Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
LONDON S W 1



Dear Stephen,

IRAQ/IRAN

1. The Iranian Permanent Representative approached Sir Colin Crowe in Plenary yesterday and asked whether he had heard of the recent wave of expulsions of Iranians from Iraq. Sir Colin said that he had not. Hoveyda went on to say that some 8,000 people had been expelled in the last three weeks at 24 hours notice or less and had lost all their property. They had been put in trucks and dumped at remote points on the frontier whence the Iranian frontier guards had had to fetch them. Hoveyda said that he realized that this might sound small beer beside 8 million Bengalis but it was a problem nevertheless and, although no publicity was being given to it as the press was preoccupied with other matters, his government felt that we ought to be aware of the development. They were puzzled by it themselves because the Iraqis were in fact approaching them to re-open negotiations on the Shatt al-Arab and other things. Sir Colin asked what sort of people were involved. Hoveyda was vague but said that many had been born in Iraq.

right!

the expelled gradually creep back.

e

27

x

2. I subsequently spoke to the Iraqi Permanent Representative who said that Hoveyda had told him about the expulsions but that he had no other information. Shabib added that he assumed that those involved were illegal immigrants.

Yours ever,

Michael.

M C S Weston

Yes - but the scale

Copied to:

H J Arbuthnott Esq
TEHRAN

A C D S MacRae Esq
BAGHDAD

of expulsions seems very large on this occasion, and allegedly includes a fair sprinkling of elderly and the infirm Iraqi nationals.

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27/x

NEQ 3/324/2

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14

PRIORITY
CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

(NED)

FM F C O 271655Z

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TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON TELNO 2761 OF 27 OCTOBER INFO TEHRAN
BAGHDAD.

YOUR TELNO 3548 (WHICH WE ARE REPEATING TO BAGHDAD), FINAL SENTENCE:
IRAN/IRAQ.

1. YOUR UNDERSTANDING IS CORRECT. YOU MAY SO INFORM THE STATE
DEPARTMENT.

2. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, THE IRAQIS OFFERED IN AUGUST 1970
TO PAY FOR 16 REFURBISHED HUNTERS WITH SULPHUR. HAWKERS DID NOT
PURSUE THIS, PREFERRING A MORE ATTRACTIVE CASH OFFER FROM THE SWISS,
TO WHOM THE AIRCRAFT WERE EVENTUALLY SOLD. THE IRAQIS HAVE
NOT RE-OPENED THE QUESTION OF HUNTERS THIS YEAR.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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Mr. like to see of R.
15/11
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agree.

Secretary of State 15
Mr. Adams
Mr. Ege
Mr. Lavery
Mr. Spiller
Miss 29/8
To. B. 1629/x
E. 1629/x

Mr Parsons
Private Secretary

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY NO. 10
NEQ 3/324/2

IRAN'S INTEREST IN THE SALE OF BRITISH MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ

- Flag A 1. The Secretary of State minuted on Tehran telegram No 856:
"Will it help with Iran if we say that we will certainly remember their approach should Iraq come along again?".
- Flag B 2. We authorised Mr Ramsbotham to deny the story about Hunters. We also authorised him, if pressed further, to say that we did not consider that any of the arms we might supply to Iraq would increase her offensive capability or pose a threat to Iran, and to make the point that we were acting contrary to our usual policy in agreeing to a discussion of these matters (FCO telegram No 605 to Tehran dated 21 October). Mr Ramsbotham made these points in speaking to Mr Khalatbari on 21 October;
- Flag C 3. Mr Khalatbari seemed reassured. (Tehran telegram No 864 to FCO dated 21 October).
3. In these circumstances, I see no need to say anything more to the Iranians, at any rate for the time being: indeed, I think we must be on our guard against getting into a position where the Iranians might think they had a right to be informed, or even consulted, about our sales of military equipment to third parties.

Mr Parsons
To note the
Sof's comment
26/10
Mr Evans.

Mr. But Evans is not clear up to any point 2
we want Iran's
goodwill.

R. M. Evans

R M Evans
Near Eastern Department

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IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A

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FM TEHRAN 201100Z
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 856 20 OCTOBER INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD,
PRIORITY BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, WASHINGTON, JEDDA, KUWAIT AND CAIRO.

MY TELEGRAM 845 (NOT TO ALL): IRAN/IRAQ

1. MY US COLLEAGUE HAS LET ME KNOW THAT IN THE LAST TWO DAYS BOTH THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND MINISTER OF COURT HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE WORSENING SITUATION WITH IRAQ, INSTANCING THE EXPULSIONS OF IRANIANS AND ALSO TAKRITI'S RECENT STATEMENT TO KUWAITI NEWSPAPER, AS-SIASA, THAT THE REAL THREAT TO PEACE CAME FROM IRAN. FURTHERMORE BOTH KHALATBARI AND ALAM (THE LATTER DIRECTLY FROM THE SHAH) HAD MENTIONED A REPORT THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WAS SELLING HUNTER AIRCRAFT TO IRAQ, AND HAS ASKED WHAT THE BRITISH WERE UP TO. MACARTHUR HAD DISCLAIMED ALL KNOWLEDGE BUT SAID THAT, IF TRUE, THIS WAS DOUBTLESS A SIMPLE COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION.

2. KHALATBARI HAS SUMMONED ME AT 1400 HOURS GMT TOMORROW, 21 OCTOBER, PROBABLY ABOUT IRAQ AND THE HUNTERS. THE US EMBASSY RECALL SEEING A RECENT REFERENCE IN THE PRESS (WHICH I AM TRYING TO TRACE) ABOUT A POSSIBLE SALE. HAS THERE BEEN ANY SALE OR ANY SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IRAQIS SINCE MY TELEGRAM 438 (OF 23 JUNE) WHEN I COMMENTED GENERALLY ON ARMS SALES TO IRAQ? IF NOT, I WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE KHALATBARI THAT NO HUNTER DEAL HAS BEEN CONCLUDED OR IS UNDER DISCUSSION OR CONSIDERATION.

3. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF INSTRUCTIONS COULD REACH ME BY 1200 GMT ON 21 OCTOBER.

RAMSBOTHAM.

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*but it helps with
Iran if we say that
we will certainly
remember their
approach should Iraq
come along
again?
SAH.
2/10*

*This is a no hering
There have been no
recent discussions
about selling Hunter
to Iraq.*

1/15/27/10



PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
777 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

1. Enter

2. Pl copy

to Mr.

NED, FLO

to be reviewed at Riyadh
& Tehran with ref
to my letter of 26 Oct

3. P/a

The Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representatives and Observers to the United Nations and has the honour to inform them of the following:

" Iran has at all times been anxious to live in peace and harmony with all countries, especially its neighbours. Towards the fulfillment of this aim, time and again, the Government of Iran has re-affirmed its desire to foster good neighbourly relations, especially with Iraq, to which the people of Iran are bound by historic, religious, as well as cultural ties.

However, despite the brotherly relations between the two peoples, the Iraqi authorities have deemed it necessary to engage in systematic harassment of the Iranian community living in that country.

Once again, and despite assurances to the contrary, the Iranian community in Iraq has been subjected to malicious ill-treatment as well as to the hostile and inconceivable behaviour of the Iraqi authorities. Moreover, this delegation deplores the fact that lately over 11,000 Iranians, long residing in Iraq, have been summarily ejected from their homes and businesses and herded overnight in trucks to isolated frontier locations and expelled from Iraq.

Summary arrests, seizure of their belongings, personal properties, money, businesses, and even personal documents such as passports and identity cards, have become the daily lot to which Iranians residing in Iraq are subjected. Fathers and sons are arrested and taken away from their homes in the middle of the night while the anguished families are left without news of their whereabouts. It is as incomprehensible as it is regrettable that innocent individuals should be made to suffer and be the victims of such harassment while being denied at the same time access to their most elementary human rights.

./...

- 2 -

Iranians residing in Iraq have, for too long, been subjected to acts ranging from search and seizure to immediate and massive expulsion, all in the gravest violation of the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the recent Proclamation at the Tehran United Nations Conference on human rights, to which Iraq adhered.

While the Iranian Government will spare no effort in aiding its nationals in their moment of distress, it cannot but be dismayed by the ruthless attitude the present Government of Iraq demonstrates by flouting established principles of international behaviour.

The victimization of innocent and law-abiding human beings runs counter to every principle that the United Nations Organization has striven to promote.

The Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations deems it his duty to call the attention of the distinguished Permanent Representatives and Observers to the United Nations to this appalling situation and shocking behaviour which contravenes all established rules and practices of the international community. "

The Permanent Representative of Iran avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Permanent Representatives and Observers the assurances of his highest consideration.

2 November 1971



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BRITISH EMBASSY

TEHRAN

17

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REGISTRY No. 18
- 9 NOV 1971

NEQ 3/324/2

4 November 1971

3/2

B Smith Esq
NED
FCO

Miss Beckett, 11/11
Mr. Egerton, 11/11
to see

Mr. Egerton

The last clause in para 4
sounds unlikely - the Iranians
might just get some Arab silence over
the Gulf, but they are hardly likely
to get support.

Dear Sir,

IRAN/IRAQ/SYRIA

2. We know from other reports that
the expulsions continue, though the scale
varies widely depending on whether the Iranians or
the Iraqis are doing the measuring!

? (4)

In Baghdad telegrams Nos 1077 and 1079 and our telegram No 845, the recent renewed expulsion of Iranian citizens from Iraq was reported. There is no sign at present of the deportations stopping; indeed, if official reports are to be believed, there is still a steady flow of refugees and no indication that this will come to an end in the foreseeable future. While there has been no public official reaction, the press has become increasingly hysterical in their denunciation of the Iraqi regime and the "brutal and inhuman" treatment of Iranian citizens. There are of course the predictable allegations of torture, confiscation of property, forcible separation of families and other emotional themes which make juicy propaganda. I enclose a photograph (not to all) from the front page of today's edition of the Tehran Journal which will give you an idea of the tenor of the comment.

I wonder if
the explanation
offered in 86 of
Mr MacRae's letter
to Mr A. Smith
of (4/XI).

2. Expulsions on this scale last happened in 1969 at the time of the Shatt-al-Arab crisis, and it seems clear that on this occasion, as Lewty suggested in his letter of 6 September to Near Eastern Department about Iraqi propaganda, that the expulsions are part of the Iraqi campaign over the islands and our withdrawal. Mass movement of refugees also gives the Iraqis excellent opportunity to infiltrate agents into Iran. SAVAK are of course well aware of this and the camps which have been set up just over the border in Borujerd are, we imagine, as much temporary prisons for SAVAK vetting operations as Red Lion and Sun Society relief headquarters.

3. Meanwhile there are rumours that relations between Iran and Syria are about to improve. In the past, hating the Iraqis has often gone hand in hand with loving the Syrians. Last July such rumours were circulating at about the same time as Syria closed its borders with Jordan and it was thought that Iran was attempting to improve its relations as some sort of rebuff to Jordan. This seemed pretty nonsensical and although we were not able to find any evidence that Iran was making any special efforts towards Syria, it seemed then,

mb

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Handy
likely.

as it does now, sense for her to do so. Clearly the
Iranians have an interest in finding further allies in the
Arab world both to balance Iraq and to get support for its
Persian Gulf policy.

4. The latest rumours arise from the Syrian President's
friendly cable to the Shah on his birthday. The press have
speculated that Syria's membership of the Federation of
Arab Republics is also helping in view of the improved
relations between Tehran and Cairo.

Yours
H J

H J Arbuthnot

Enc

Copied to:-

Chanceries
BEIRUT
BAGHDAD
BAHRAIN RES
CAIRO

- 2 -

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ANGUISH—A young girl whose parents have been expelled from Iraq by the Ba'athist regime of that country weeps in despair at a refugee camp in Iran.

UNCLASSIFIED
3/19/3



RECEIVED REGISTRY No. 1 - 6 NOV 1971
NEQ 3/324

With the compliments of
**THE UNITED KINGDOM MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
(M C S Weston)**

S L Egerton Esq
Arabian Dept FCO

4 November 1971

845 THIRD AVENUE,
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022

With reference to my letter 3/19/2 of
26 October.

1. Mr. J. H. G. B. Beckett

2. Enter
with spec
o.p.a.

87 xi

CONFIDENTIAL

British Embassy

BAGHDAD

NEQ 3/324/2

4 November 1971

3/1

H J Arbuthnott Esq
TEHRAN

This letter directly
contradicts the version
of events apparently

believed by our Embassy in Tehran: see
§1 of Mr Arbuthnott's letter of 7/17 below.

2. I believe the Baghdad version. Tehran
ought not to be so gullible so often.

RTGymt 11/11

IRAQ/IRAN RELATIONS: EXPULSION OF IRANIANS

1. The approach by Hoveyda reported in Michael Weston's letter
3/19/2 of 26 October to you, was no doubt part of a routine lobbying
exercise which the Iranians seem to have been carrying out in
several major capitals. But you might nevertheless like to know
how the episode reported in our telno 53 (copy attached for
New York) ended.

2. According to our Iranian colleagues here, the Iraqi campaign
was more or less called off on about 15 October. At this stage
loud-speaker vans started touring some of the main areas of
Iranian settlement such as Kadhimain near Baghdad and Kerbala,
assuring the Iranians that provided their papers were in order,
they might stay. Thus although a considerable number of the
community had already by that time been expelled (our Iranian
colleagues are now sticking to what is clearly the "official"
figure of about 8,000), others, who had had their date of enforced
exit extended until the end of the month, have been able to stay on.

3. Meanwhile, the Minister of the Interior, General Sa'adun Ghaidan,
made a statement carried in Al Ittihad on Sunday 24 October (though
for some reason not reported in the English language paper until the
28th) denying any "mass deportation of Iranians or Feili Kurds".
He said that all that had occurred was that, acting in conformity
with international laws and conventions, his Ministry had laid down
new rules for the prevention for illegal entry into Iraq They
were equally acting within their rights and conforming with
international law when they deported foreigners who had entered Iraq
after 1958 whose residence permit had expired or who had no work
permit. Moreover, foreign students of religious affairs were
expected to leave the country after the termination of their studies
(which in Iraq were expected to last 5 years). In conclusion,
General Ghaidan said that "not a single foreigner who had entered
Iraq illegally before 1958 had been deported".

4. ~~This last resounding statement is, of course, certainly untrue.~~

...

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4. This last resounding statement is, of course, certainly untrue. I myself am aware of one case history since I had to pursue the case of the cook of our former Air Attaché. This man had lived in Iraq continuously since 1917, had residence and work permits both recently issued and in order; yet had the pleasure of seeing these documents torn up before his eyes and of being told that he was now under arrest and would be taken to the border by lorry within three days. (In fact, after much lobbying on his behalf, a stay of execution was allowed until the end of the month, to allow him to sell his house and belongings.)

5. However, the Iranian Embassy here were at last able to ensure that the small number of teachers who had been under threat, were released.

6. What the purpose of this ugly little campaign was, we are still not sure. The only plausible reason we can add to those contained in our telegram under reference was that the Iraqis may have planned it as a cloak under which they might smuggle in saboteurs to disrupt the Iranian celebrations. It certainly seems an odd coincidence that the campaign was halted just as the Persepolis Picnic (if that is not too irreverent a description from Baghdad) drew to a close. At all events, the expulsions seem definitely to have ended (- at least, until next time.....).

7. One last point; we were puzzled by the statement by Hoveyda, reported in Weston's letter, that "the Iraqis were in fact approaching them to re-open negotiations on the Shatt al Arab". We had not heard this - unless Hoveyda could have been referring to the Iraqi Note mentioned in our telegram no 53 to you: have you?

A C D S MacRae

c.c. **M C S Weston Esq UKMIS NEW YORK (with copy of telno 53)**
S L Egerton Esq Arabian Department FCO

PRIORITY

EN CLAIR

FROM KUWAIT. 110840Z NOVEMBER.

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19

TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, TELEGRAM NUMBER 502,
DATED 11 NOVEMBER 1971., REPEATED PRIORITY INFO TO TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD

IRAQ - IRAN RELATIONS.

1. WE RECEIVED ON 10 NOVEMBER A THREE PAGE CIRCULAR NOTE
IN ARABIC FROM THE IRANIAN EMBASSY DATED 8 NOVEMBER, IN WHICH
IT ATTACKED THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IN INTEMPERATE TERMS FOR THE
RECENT EXPULSION OF 11000 IRANIANS RESIDENT IN IRAQ AND THE "BAR-
BAROUS AND INHUMAN" WAY IN WHICH THIS WAS DONE.
IT ENDED BY SAYING "WHILE IRAN IS FULLY PREPARED TO STAND UP
TO THIS HOSTILE AND PECULIAR ATTITUDE IT IS CONCERNED THAT THE
PEOPLES OF THE WORLD SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE MENTALITY OF THE
GOVERNMENT WHICH CALLS FROM TIME TO TIME FOR THE STABILITY AND
UNITY OF THE AREA"

WILTON.

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BRITISH EMBASSY

KUWAIT

22 November 1971

3/10

D I Lewty Esq
Baghdad

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 24 NOV 1971 NEQ 3/324/2
--

7/11

IRANIAN/IRAQI RELATIONS

(102)

Please refer to our Telegram No 502 to the F C O.

2. The Iraqi Embassy have come back quickly with a circular note dated 14 November, denying the Iranian changes, claiming that Iranians in Iraq were living peacefully with no discrimination against them and emphasising that any expellees there might have been were violators of residence regulations.

D Wigan

Mr. Smith
p 1324/11

C.C.

N J Browne Esq
Tehran

Near Eastern Department
F C O



PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
14 EAST 79TH STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10021



21

Enter

1. Carter
2. PL copy
to NEP,
FCO

*Shamir
at Tel Aviv
& Baghdad*

3. D/a.

16/11

The Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Missions and Observers accredited to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the Note circulated by the Permanent Representative of Iran dated November 2, 1971.

In that Note the Permanent Representative of Iran alleged that the Iraqi authorities are engaged in "systematic harassment" of the Iranian community, living in Iraq. While totally rejecting these unfounded allegations, the Permanent Representative of Iraq wishes to make the following clarifications:

The people of Iraq have been known through the ages for their hospitality and the generous welcome always accorded to all those who sought shelter and refugee within their country. Throughout the centuries, and particularly since Iraq attained its independence, no one who sought

11 MB

[Signature]
p29

Cont/.

shelter in Iraq in conformity with Iraqi laws and regulations, have been turned away at its doors. The numerous ethnic and religious communities that live harmoniously in Iraq are a living witness to this open and generous policy which the present Iraqi government is eager to preserve.

However, no matter how liberal and generous the policy of a State is, regarding alien residents certain internationally recognized norms regulating the entry and residents in the country have to be observed.

In the case of Iraq, the long borders between Iraq and Iran which stretches for over one thousand miles have always provided ample opportunities to those seeking illegal entry into Iraq. For obvious economic, social and security reasons, such an influx of illegal entrants cannot be condoned.

Under these circumstances the Iraqi authorities had to deal with the situation in

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accordance with the existing Iraqi laws. These laws impose the imprisonment and the immediate deportation thereafter in respect of any violator. The Iraqi Government, however, took no steps to prosecute those who have entered the country illegally and have taken up illegal residence. They were merely asked to leave the country.

Whether the persons affected were Iranians or of other nationalities was totally irrelevant to the application of the law.

It is incumbent upon neighbouring States in accordance with international practice to co-operate in order to ensure every possible control of such illegal movement across their common borders. Regretfully the Government of Iran has not extended such co-operation, thus greatly contributing to the illegal entry into Iraq of a large number of Iranian citizens. Needless to say the steps which were undertaken by the Iraqi authorities to arrest this influx were strictly within Iraq's sovereign rights and which every country would apply if faced with a similar situation.

The Permanent Representative of Iran professed his country's desire to live in

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peace and harmony with all countries and expressed his country's wish "to foster good neighbourly relations, especially with Iraq." While commending such an attitude expressed on the part of the Permanent Representative of Iran, it is unfortunate that the facts of the situation, and particularly his Government's policy toward Iraq, do not support his claims. Instead of co-operating with Iraq the Government of Iran has repeatedly violated its international obligations towards Iraq and has sought to cover-up its actions by raising occasionally such side and irrelevant issues.

On April 19, 1969, the Government of Iran declared "null and void" the valid and mutually binding "Boundary Treaty of 1937, between Iraq and Iran." This illegal act was accompanied and followed by various actions which encroached upon Iraqi sovereignty and territorial integrity and thus, created a situation detrimental to the good relations between the neighbourly countries and dangerously threatened the peace and security of the area. While affirming the validity of the 1937 Treaty, the Iraq Government reacted with great patience

and self-restraint. It has sought to resolve this problem peacefully and within the strict rules and principles of International Law, first and foremost of which is the respect of valid and mutually ratified treaties. Iraq has often called upon the Government of Iran in and outside the United Nations, to respect its treaty obligations and to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice regarding any complaint it may have relating to the application of the 1937 Boundary Treaty. Unfortunately, the attitude of Iran has been totally negative and issues to which reference was made in the Note of the Permanent Representative of Iran were often used to obscure and confuse the real issue.

The Permanent Representative of Iraq while affirming the bonds of neighbourliness, religion and culture that binds the people of Iran and Iraq, cannot but reject the allegations contained in the Note of the Permanent Representative of Iran which in themselves constitute an interference in the domestic affairs of Iraq.

The Permanent Representative of Iraq expresses once again the hope that the Government

of Iran will observe the recognised rules and principles of International Law and show the necessary respect for its treaty obligations; thus, paving the way for the maintainance of good neighbourly relations which the Government of Iraq earnestly desires.

The Permanent Representative of Iraq avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Permanent Missions and Observers to the United Nations the assurances of his highest consideration.

New York, November 11, 1971



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The Iranian Government claims that Iraq is ill-treating the Iranians residing therein and that Iraq has repatriated a large number of Iranians outside Iraq.

This Iranian allegation is absolutely unfounded and does not conform with actual facts, since the Iranian nationals residing in Iraq receive every assistance and are given good treatment in the same way as other foreign subjects as against the bad treatment received by the Iraqi nationals residing in Iran.

documents/

documents authorising them to enter Iraq and reside therein. This is applied in all independent countries. The repatriation was applied to the Iranians who entered Iraq illicitly and illegitimately, a fact which does not permit them to reside and work in Iraq. Such a measure is in the core of the competence of the Iraqi Government in exercising the right of sovereignty. The Iranian allegation is only a new evidence of the attempt made by the Iranian authorities to interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq, a matter which is categorically rejected by Iraq. The competent Iraqi authorities did not enforce the provisions of law against these Iranian infiltrators as is required by the Iraqi Law of Residence, which provides for imprisonment for a period of three years or by imposing a fine of I.D. 300 on any one who entered Iraq illegitimately, in view of its desire to reveal its good intention. The Iraqi authorities only obliged these Iranians to leave Iraq and return to their country, whereas the Iranians who entered Iraq legitimately and who are in possession of legal valid documents authorising them to reside, they are still residing in Iraq and practising their works most freely and are accorded good treatment similar to other resident foreigners.

The Iraqi Government had already elucidated these facts, which refute the Iranian falsifications, through the Minister of the Interior on 27 October 1971.

The foregoing will reveal ~~the~~ the falsification of the Iranian claims and allegations which in fact constitute a part of the campaign of falsifications being carried out by the Iranian Government to cover its expansionist and hostile intentions towards Iraq and the Arab Gulf area.

Having/

Having elucidated these facts, the Iraqi Government is in no way able to accept any foreign interference in the internal affairs of Iraq or its national sovereignty. The Iranian Government, by encouraging its subjects to infiltrate and enter Iraq and the Arab Gulf area illegitimately and in a manner inconsistent with the principles of international law and the requirements of bon voisinage, in order to ensure political and expansionist aims, is considered solely responsible for the results accruing from the adoption by the competent Iraqi authorities of legitimate measures within (the scope of) their laws in force in its region and in accordance with the rights of its sovereignty, in deporting and repatriating those who do not fulfil the conditions prescribed by law for residence and remaining in Iraqi territory.

This Ministry requests the esteemed Diplomatic Corps to communicate the foregoing to their respective Governments in order that they may be acquainted with actual facts.

The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to express its highest consideration and esteem.

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy,
Baghdad.

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M^{rs} V. Beckett,
F.C.O.

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With the compliments of

**THE UNITED KINGDOM MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

M. C. S. WESTON

**845 THIRD AVENUE,
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022**



Cutting dated 11 DEC. 1971 19

Iraq and Libya ready for more action in Persian Gulf dispute

From Paul Martin
Beirut, Dec 10

Libya and Iraq today prepared to launch new political campaigns against Iran and Britain in protest at the seizure by Iran of the Tunb islands at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. But the emirate of Ras al-Khaimah, to which the islands belonged, appeared to have lapsed into confusion over what to do next.

Hopes that the dispute would be settled amicably had risen today when the Egyptian Middle East news agency announced that the Union of Arab Emirates had welcomed Ras al-Khaimah's application to join.

The point here is that on Monday the deputy ruler of Ras al-Khaimah said that the emirate was dropping all its pre-conditions in applying to join the Union, including the demand that the six present members should boycott Iran politically and economically and expel all Iranians from their soil.

However, the Iraq news agency today quoted the Ras al-Khaimah Government as denying that it had withdrawn these pre-conditions. Meanwhile Prince Khalid, the Crown Prince of the emirate, arrived in Tripoli to discuss the situation with Colonel Moammar Gaddafi, the Libyan leader.

In the wake of its decision to nationalize British Petroleum and withdraw its holdings from British banks in retaliation for "Whitehall's complicity" in the Tunb seizure, Libya has declared its intention to meddle further in Gulf affairs.

The Iraq statement makes it clear that, after recovering from the initial shock of the Libyan action, the Baathist regime in Baghdad is also interested in the issue of the disputed islands.

There is growing evidence that Libyan and other militant enthusiasm is not shared by Ras al-Khaimah's neighbouring emirates. This reluctance was hinted at by Major Abdul Salaam Jalloud, the Libyan deputy Prime Minister, when he declared in Abu Dhabi that Libya had offered to send

troops to occupy and "protect" the Tunbs.

Although Libya had received permission from Iraq for its force to land at Basra on the way to the Gulf, the offer, Major Jalloud said, had been "refused by the emirates themselves".

Furthermore, contrary to the wishes of Libya and those of Iraq, whose vociferous and radical participation in Gulf affairs is yet to be matched by deeds, the Arab League has also called for restraint.

Although the League emergency session on the Tunb landings, held in Cairo this week, was said to have taken "secret decisions", the most important was that the conflict should be settled peacefully through contacts with Iran.

What has made the islands dispute all the more serious is the manner in which Ras al-Khaimah has attempted to play one neighbouring big power against the other during the past year or so.

Soon after it was announced that Britain would pursue her earlier declared policy of withdrawing from the Gulf by 1971, a Kuwait newspaper reported that Ras al-Khaimah had sold the islands to Iran and that the material benefits from the sale were already becoming obvious around the ruler's palace.

The story was denied but it did leave a bad taste in some mouths.

The ruler is known to have courted the Iraqis, whose militant posture on the Gulf has set them in search of problems which can be turned into pan-Arab causes.

Ras al-Khaimah is also known to have enjoyed the attentions of Saudi Arabia, whose interest was to sabotage the proposed seven-state Union, which would be dominated by the Saudis' arch-rival Abu Dhabi.

As far as the members of the Union are concerned, the pre-conditions set by Ras al-Khaimah are unacceptable. Abu Dhabi, the most powerful member, and Dubai, the second most important, both have close ties with Iran. And Sharjah has settled its dispute over the island of Abu Musa by signing an agreement with Teheran.

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Cutting dated 15 DEC 1971...19

Gulf crisis hits London trade trip

THE first British trade mission to Syria and Iraq for seven years has been postponed at the request of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office because of the crisis in the Gulf—Iraq has broken off diplomatic relations with this country following the Iranian seizure of the islands at the mouth of the Gulf.

Britain has had no diplomatic relations with Syria since the Six Day War. The mission, mounted by the London Chamber of Commerce, was to have spent about a week in Syria, a week in Iraq and a few days in Lebanon in mid-January.

At the invitation of the Damascus Chamber of Commerce, a group of about 10 bankers and industrialists, led by Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews, a director of Massey-Ferguson and chairman of the Chamber's Middle East section, was planning to review the general prospects for trade.

The mission organiser, Mr. Fred Osborne, commented yesterday: "It seemed a pretty silly time to try to mount a new effort. The situation is unlikely to have any long-term effect. We had decided to postpone on purely commercial grounds before the Foreign Office suggested it."

The group is likely to go out in April.

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**BRITISH EMBASSY
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2 December 1971

Mr Smith
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EMBASSY OF SWITZERLAND
B A G H D A D



The Embassy of Switzerland present their compliments to the Diplomatic Missions and have the honour to inform them that the Swiss Government has, at the request of His Imperial Iranian Majesty's Government and with the consent of the Government of the Republic of Iraq, agreed to assume the protection of Iranian interests in Iraq following the severance of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Iraq and the Empire of Iran.

The Embassy of Switzerland avail themselves of this opportunity to renew to the Diplomatic Missions the assurances of their highest consideration. W

Baghdad, December 14, 1971



To the Diplomatic Missions
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Mr Smith

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18 December 1971

Dispute Over Iran's Seizure Of Tunb Islands In Persian Gulf; British Arms Sales To Iraq. Political Relations Between Iraq And Iran. 29 Sept. 1971. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 17/1538. Newspaper Cutting And Photograph. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107476917/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=19787ce5&pg=1. Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.